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Abstract _ 
This paper introduces the 'Extended Pareto' axiom on Social welfare functions and gives a 
characterization of the axiom when it is assumed that the Social Welfare Functions that satisfy it 
in a framework of preferences over 10tteries also satisfy the restrictions (on the domain and range 
ofpreferences) implied by the von-Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. With the addition oftwo other 
axioms: Anonymity and Weak HA* it is shown that there is a unique Social Welfare Function 
called Relative Utilitarianism that consists of normalizing individual utilities between zero and one 
and then adding them. 
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1 Introduction 
Arrow [1], as far back as 1963, considered the possibility of a resolution of the 
social choice paradox by the use of a "broader concept of rationality," mean-
ing thereby the use of the von-Neumann-Morgenstern axioms on prefeiences. 
In this paper I provide an axiomatization of a Social Welfare Function, in the 
sense of Arrow [1] called "Relative Utilitarianism" ~ in a framework of pref-
erences over lotteries and using the vN-M axioms on preferences. Relative 
Utilitarianism consists of normalizing individual utilities and then adding 
them, and was introduced separately in Mertens and Dhillon [12]. This ap-
proach is not new, indeed impossibility results have already been proved in 
the more general context of cardinal preferences of which v-NM axioms are 
a special case (see e.g. Kalai and Schmeidler [10], Sen [15]). Chichilinsky [3], 
studies the aggregation problem when intensities are taken into account, and 
the SWF is assumed to be continuous,anonymous and to respect unanimity. 
The result of this paper is however a positive one; I show that a SWF exists 
and is unique under the axioms proposed. 
These axioms are: the classical Anonymity axiom (see May [11]), a weak-
ened version (conceptually) of Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alterna-
tives, Weak lIA *, and Extended Pareto. The collective choice problem is 
usually viewed as a map from individual preferences to social preferences. 
Most voting rules, on the other hand, are in "steps", i.e. they first aggre-
gate preferences of individuals in smaller units and then use these "group" 
choices to derive social choices. If one were to allow different "groups" (or 
coalitions) in society, what reasonable restrictions could we impose on them 
and what do these restrictions imply for the social rule? A requirement that 
arises quite naturally is the analog of Pareto for groups: this is what the 
Extended Pareto axiom provides. Weak HA* may be viewed both as one 
way to adapt Arrow's Independence axiom to the context of preferences over 
lotteries, and as an axiom that leads to a formulation of the problem that is 
quite similar to the bargaining problem without assigning special importance 
to a disagreement point. 
The main results include a characterization of the Extended Pareto ax-
iom in the context of vN-M preferences and an axiomatic characterization 
of Relative Utilitarianism. The latter result is close to and may be consid-
ered a generalization of May's [11] Theorem (9n majority rule) to bigger sets 
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of alternatives2 Indeed, as in May, we eschew the use of interpersonal com-
parisons as primitives. This paper provides an alternative axiomatization 
of Relative Utilitarianism avoiding the use of Continuity as in Mert'ens and 
Dhillon, an axiom that has no clear ethical interpretation, except on negative 
considerations, i.e. "it is only a test that sorne solution is unsatisfactory, but 
does not tell us which are the specific equity considerations that force the 
specific solution" (Mertens and Dhillon). 
There has been, in recent years, a renewed interest in Harsanyi's [9] Utili-
tarianism theorems (see e.g. Weymark [17], Mongin [13] Coulhon and Mongin 
[4], Hammond [8]). This paper shares sorne of the features of the Harsanyi 
model. In particular, the use of vN-M utilities for individuals and society 
and the use of Pareto rules. WhHe Harsanyi's theorem is a single profile one 
however, this paper uses the classical definition (Arrow) of the SWF. We 
generalize Harsanyi 's single profile result, and the use of additional axioms 
fixes the weights for individuals to be the inverse of the range of the utility 
function for an individual. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces nota-
tion, Section 3 discusses the axioms used, Section 4 gives the main results and 
then the proofs of these, and also provides examples to show the necessity of 
the axioms. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Preliminaries 
The set of individuals is denoted by N = {1, ... ,n, ...} and there are #N 
indi\'iduals in the society, with 00 > #N 2: 3. I denote the set of alternatives 
or pure prospects by A. Following Mertens and Dhillon [12], I consider a 
framework of preferences over the set A(A) of all lotteries on A (finite), 
which is interpreted as sorne set of 'pure prospects', and assume that aH 
such preferences have a von Neumann- Morgenstern utility representation. I 
denote the set of preference orderings on AA by 1:.. A preference orderíng is 
a refiexive, complete and transitive binary relation on AA x AA. The n-fold 
cartesian product of 1:. is denoted by 1:.N • We use the term preference profile 
for an element of I:.N, and denote this by nN. For each nN E I:.N, the ith 
coordinate of nN is denoted by ni . 
2see the heuristic proof in Mertens and Dhillon [12] for the one dimensional case which 
is equivalent to having only two alternatives but which is Dot studied in this paper. 
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The set of strict subsets of N is denoted by ~. 
Definition 1: A social welfare function is a map c.p : l-N --+ l- that associates 
to any profile R E l-N a social preference RE l-. 
Definition 2: A Group Aggregation Rule for a subgroup G is a map tPG : 
l-G --+ l- where G E ~.
 
Definition 3: A Group Aggregation Rule satisfies Individualism iff whenever 
all individuals in the subgroup are completely indifferent then so is the sub-
group. 
For aH G, we assume tPG satisfies Individualism. In addition, we assume: 
tPG = R¡ whenever G = {i} 
For any preference relation R, I stands for the corresponding indifference 
relation and 'P stands for the corresponding strict preference. Society's pref-
erence ordering is denoted by R. For any subgroup G¡ e N the preferences 
tPG¡ (RG¡) are represented by RG¡ . S denotes the space of utility functions 
on A, and an element of SN is denoted by ü. 
The Axioms 
Axiom 1: Extended Pareto. 
For any profile of preferences R N E l-N and for any 2 element par-
tition {Gl , G2 } of N, 3tPGll tPG2 such that: for any pair of lotteries p 
and q 
pRG,q i = 1,2 
=> pRq 
And if further, P'PG1 q, then 
p'Pq. 
Remark. 
According to the axiom if there exist functions that aggregate preferences of 
individuals in (disjoint) subgroups of society (e.g. states in a country of N 
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individuals) then the Social Welfare Function should satisfy Pareto in terms 
of the "aggregate preferences" of these subgroups. There are no restrictions 
on the functional form of these Group Aggregation Rules except that they 
depend only on the preferences of individuals in the subgroups and they 
satisfy Individualism. In so far as the consequence of using this axiom with 
the vN-M axioms goes, it is shown that in fact the Group Aggregation Rules 
also satisfy the Extended Pareto axiom and are of the same functional form 
as the SWF, hence the axiom seems to be the logical expression of what 
is meant by aggregating preferences in a "consistent" way. There is an ob-
vious difficulty in checking whether any given SWF satisfies this condition 
(given that there may be many such Group Aggregation Rules): hence in 
the specific framework of this paper Theorem 1 gives a characterization of 
the axiom3 . Given the assumptions on the Group Aggregation Rules we 
have as a consequence of the Extended Pareto condition, a "multi-profile" 
interpretation of the axiom using the equivalence between the Group Aggre-
gation Rule for a subgroup G and the SWF on the profile where N\G is 
universally indifferent4 • Then the axiom can also be written as : For any 
partition of N into two subgroups Gl and G2 , and for any three profiles: 
('R.G1 ,IG2), (IG1,'R.G2 ), and 'R.N = ('R.G1 ,'R.G2 ): Iffor any pair oflotteries p 
and q: 
and 
pr.p(IGl 'R.G2 )q, 
::} pr.p('R.N)q 
where 
'R.N = ('R.G1, 'R.G2 ) 
This reconstruction of the axiom has the fol1owing interpretation: consider a 
partition of the set of citizens of a country into group 1 and group 2. If the 
social welfare function is such that it would choose lottery p over lottery q 
whenever group 2 was unanimously indifferent between all alternatives, and 
group 1 has sorne preferences given by 'R.G1 , that it would choose p over q 
3It should be noted here that there may exist SWF's that satisfy the Extended Pareto 
axiom but not the Continuity axiom used in Mertens and Dhillon ( e.g. choose the func-
tions Fn(un) in Theorem 1 to be discontinuous in th~ir sense. 
4 Proved in Lemma 1. 
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when the situation is reversed, i.e. group 1 was unanimously indifferent be-
tween p and q, and group 2 has preferences given by 'RG'2, then it must be 
true that then society must still prefer p to q, when preferences are given by 
('RG1 , 'RG'2). The restrietions it imposes on the SWF are a kind of separabil-
ity in group preferences and monotonicity with respect to these preferences. 
In the framework of interpersonal comparibility with translation invariance 
(which is not a primitive in this paper), utilitarianism is an obvious candi-
date for a SWF that satisfies Extended Pareto, since it is both separable 
in terms of the preferences of any subgroup and monotonic with respect to 
them. However weighted utilitarianism where the weights depend on the 
whole profile would not satisfy this axiom (example given in the last section 
of this paper). .. 
In the case of two individuals, the axiom is equivalent to Pareto and to a 
form of Monotonicity (or Positive Association) (a proof of the equivalence of 
a form of Monotonicity and Extended Pareto is given in the appendix). 
Axiorn 2 : Anonyrnity 
Any perrnutation of the profile of preferences leaves the social pref-
erences unchanged. 
This axiom is standard and discussions can be found in the literature (e.g. 
lvlay [11], also Sen [15]). 
Axiorn 3: Weak I1A* 
Consider any two profiles 'R and 'R' , such that they coincide on 
lotteries on a subset A' of A, and in addition that every lottery on 
A\A
' 
is unanirnously indifferent to sorne lottery on A', for each of 
the two profiles. Then social preferences also coincide on AA
'
. 
Axiorn 4: N eutrality expresses that the narnes of the alternatives 
do not rnatter. Forrnally, at least when A(A) consists of alllotteries 
with finite support, any perrnutation 1r of A induces a perrnutation 
of the space of preferences: 'R 1--+ R1r where p'R1r q iff p o1r'Rq o1r. Then 
Rernark on Weak I1A*: 
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This axiom is weaker (conceptually5) than Arrow's Independence of Irrel-
evant Alternatives. Formally however it is difficult to compare the two as 
one would need a version of HA suitable to the framework at hand Le. of 
preferences over lotteries. Since it is impossible to change preferences over 
a subset of lotteries on A without also changing preferences over all other 
lotteries when underIying preferences over A have changed, the difficulty of 
finding an obvious analog to HA is clear. The axiom is in the spirit of Neu-
trality, but in addition it implies e.g that the problem where alternative a is 
unanimously indifferent to b and the one where it is unanimously indifferent 
to e should not have different solutions, everything else fixed. Together with 
Pareto Indifference (and vN-M preferences) the axiom implies that one can 
restrict one's attention to convex sets in utility space, quite similar to the 
bargaining problem. The difference between the bargaining problem and the 
social problem lies only in the additional datum of the disagreement point. 
This is proved in the form of Proposition 2 below. 
A note on the dimension condition. 
By Pareto, (ef.Proposition O Appendix), social preferences are represented 
by (vN-M) utility functions that satisfy: 
u = L An((Ü)nEN)Un +,8 (1) 
nEN 
where An is a strictly positive real number. Let the number of alternatives 
be m and the number of individuals be k. 
Thus if we view the social utility, U, as an m x 1 vector it is equal by 
equation (1) to the product of a "coefficient" matrix of dimension m x k + 1 
and the vector Aof dimension k+1 x 1 then the system has a unique solution 
in Aiff the coefficient matrix has full rank. Thus the rank of the coefficient 
matrix is the number of linearIy independent non-constant utility vectors in 
the profile. Equivalently, in case A is of infinite dimension, we look at the 
dimension of the smallest affine subspace containing the convex set 
{< Un,P > Ip E ~A} e lRN 
This is the dimension d(ü) or sometimes d referred to in the rest of the 
papero 
5Because oí the additional requirement on profiles that can be compared using the 
axiom. 
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4 The Results 
In this seetion 1 present the results oí the paper. Prooís are presented in the 
next section. Proposition O is basically a multi-profile version oí Hars.anyi's 
Aggregation Theorem [9] wherein it was shown that vN-M preíerences and 
Pareto Indifference imply that social utility must be a weighted sum oí in-
dividual utilities. Proposition Osimply modifies this result to the case oí a 
SWF, the difference being only that now social utility is a weighted sum oí 
individuals utilities, the weights being íunctions oí the profile, and satisíy-
ing (given ordinality oí the representations) suitable homogeneity properties 
and translation invariance. What Extended Pareto accomplishes in addition 
to Strong Pareto as used in Proposition O is to add the restriction that the 
weight oí each person n depends only on 'Rn and not the whole profile. 
Proposition O (Proposition 1, Mertens and Dhillon [12]): The social welfare 
functions '..p that satisfy the Pareto axiom are those which can be represented 
by a map A from SN to IRN such that 
1. An(Ü) > O, Vn, V(ü) E SN. 
2. Jf Vn E N, Un is a representation of 'Rn , then LneN An(Ü).Un zs a 
representation of '..p('RN ) 
3. • An(Ü) ís translation ínvaríant, i.e., 
if V n = Un + O'n, Vn, with O'n E IR, then AneÜ) = An(V') 
• An(Ü) is posítívely homogeneous of degree zero in Uk, Vk =1- n 
and if Un ís not constant, of degree minus one in Un, i. e., if Vn = 
f3nun, Vn, with f3n > O then AneV) = f3;;lA n(Ü) 
The first result 1 have is a characterization oí the Extended Pareto Axiom 
in the íramework oí vN-M preíerences. In the theorem below the restriction 
on the number oí alternatives arises because oí the dimension condition, 
the result has been proved only íor profiles with dimension greater than 
two. If a dummy axiom is added, it would be true íor all profiles, as it 
is trivially true if dimension equals one and aH individuals have the same 
preíerence, while the case where aH individuals have one preíerence or its 
exact opposite can be proved as weH, using' the heuristics in Mertens and 
Dhillon [12]. The only case that is problematic is the dimension two case. 
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The number of individuals is assumed to be bigger than four because in case 
of two individuals Extended Pareto does not give any stronger restriction 
than Pareto, and we need more than three individuals if anonymity is not 
assumed. The proof is by construction of an appropriate function. 
Theorem 1: 
(A)1f #A ~ 4 and #N ~ 4 , a SWF satisfies the Extended Pareto axiom iff  
it can be represented by : 
u = L u~('Rn)' whenever d(il) > 2, (2) 
nEN 
where U is a vN-M utility repr~~entation of social preferences , and each u~ 
is a (unique, upto the function Fn) representation of individual preferences, 
such that 
(3) 
where h(un) - Un - minaEA Un (a), is a utílity funetion in IRA, and Fn : 
IRA -+ IR+ is positively homogeneous of degree 1 (if Un is not constant) and 
translation invariant6 • 1f Un is constant define Fn(u n) = 1. 
(B) There exists only one funetion Fn(un) from the space of bounded utility 
funetions S to IR++ that yields with equation (3) above, the given SWF for 
profiles with d( il) > 2 (upto multiplication by a positive constant independent 
of Un or of the profile). 
Proposition 1 then shows that with Anonymity the functions >'n(un ) are the 
same funetions for aH n E N. 
Proposition 1: 
For a fixed set of alternatives A, with #A ~ 4, and #N ~ 3, d(il) > 2 the 
social welfare funetions 'P that satisfy the Extended Pareto axiom and the 
Anonymity axiom are those that satisfy equation (2) of Theorem 1 and in 
addition the funetions F(n, u) are independent of individual n. 
The third result is a characterisation of the Weak nA* axiom with Pareto 
Indifference in the framework of vN-M utilities. 
Proposition 2: 
A map 'P satisfies the Pareto 1ndifference and Weak IIA" axiom iff the maps 
6Note thatFn((h(un)(-)) = Fn((un)(-)) by translation invariance. 
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>. of Proposition o satisfy in addition that >.(ü) = >'(ti), whenever 
F = {([< un,p >]nENlp E ~(A))} = {([< u~,p' >]nENlp' E ~(A))} 
Final1y 1 define Relative Utilitarianism, and state the main theorem which 
gives necessary and sufficient conditions for Relative Utilitarianism. 
Definition 4: Relative Utilitarianism: 
Let 
For u E SN, 
U= L (~) 
n:p(u»o p(un) 
represents a social preference over lotieries which is independent of the utility 
representations of individual preferences. 
Theorem 2: 
For a fixed set of a!ternatives A such that #A ~ 4 and for al! N such that 
#N ~ 3 and for al! profiles such that d(ü) > 2, a SWF 'P(('R.n)nEN) satis-
fies Extended Pareto, Anonymity, Weak IlA *, if and only if it is "Relative 
Utilitarianism ". 
Remarks 
1. The result may be more meaningful1y viewed as a representation result 
than a characterisation of Utilitarianism. As this issue has been adequately 
addressed in the literature on Harsanyi's Theorems [4] (see, e.g. Weymark 
[17]), 1 will not comment on this here, however, it could be observed vis-a-
vis Sen's [14] objection that the use of vN-M utilities is arbitrary, that any 
monotonic transform of individual (vN-M) utilities is compatible with the 
same social ordering as long as the same transform7 is used for al1 individuals. 
Thus, in this framework, it would seem that utilities have meaning only as 
measures of preferences. 
2. Observe that we begin with no interpersonal comparibility but end up 
with full comparibility. Which are the axioms therefore that give us this 
comparibility? The answer to this is not obvious. Al1 the axioms together 
7transforms different across individuals would violate the vN-M postulates for society. 
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imply interpersonal comparibility, but if any one of the axioms has to be 
isolated, it must be Anonyrnity, since it is this axiom that rules out the use 
of different scaling for different individuals. 
3. Finally as remarked by Sen [14], the lack of full comparibility in the Nash 
solution is absorbed by the fact that origins get subtracted out while the 
units simply change the scale of the product without changing the ordering, 
even if the origins and units change differently for different individuals. In 
our solution this is done in the reverse direction, i.e., changes in origins get 
subtracted out, while changes in units are absorbed by compensating changes 
in the weights. 
4.1 Proofs 
Proofs are presented in this section. 
Proof of Proposition o: See Appendix. 
Proof of Theorem 1 
Observe that if 'l/;e is taken as the restriction of the SWF to the profile on 
subgroup G (hence having the same representation) any SWF which has 
the aboye representation satisfies Extended Pareto. Thus we now prove the 
converse. 
The structure of the proof is as follows: Lemma 1 proves that aH 'l/;e that are 
induced by a SWF that satisfies Extended Pareto must themselves satisfy 
Extended Pareto (appropriately defined for G). Lemma 2 then shows that 
any such tPe, and indeed even <p must be a weighted sum of utilities of 
elements of the partition of G or N. Lemma 3 provides the characterization 
result for a subgroup of three individuals in the case of a fuH dimensional 
profile. \Ve know such a profile exists because of the conditions imposed. This 
has two corollaries, (1) the result for any full dimensional profile with #G 
indi"iduals and (2) the result for a subgroup of two individuals. Next Lemma 
4 proves that if the result holds for subgroups with number of individuals 
#G and dimension d, then it holds for subgroups with number of individuals . 
#G + 2 and profiles of dimension d - 1, whenever #N ;::: 4 and d(ü) > 
2. Lemma 5 proves that if the result holds for subgroups with number of 
individuals #G and profiles of dimension d then it holds as weH for subgroups 
of number #G - 1 and profiles of dimension d - 1, whenever #G ;::: 3 and 
d( ü) ;::: 2. Lemmas 4 and 5 are used to prove the result for aH G using 
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induction. 
Finally the case of an arbitrary N 2:: 4, and profiles of dirnension bigger than 
two is solved using the solutions for the subgroups and Lernrna 4 applied to 
N. 
The lernrnas are now presented. 
Lemma 1: 
1f:3 a SWF that satisfies Extended Pareto w.r.t. any funetions 1/JG then all 
such functions for any G E ~ must satisfy: 
1/JG(RG) = cp(RG,ZN\G) 
where RG,ZN\G represents the p'rofile RN whenever there is total indifference 
Vn E N\G. 
Proof 
Assurne there exists a SWF that satisfies Extended Pareto w.r.t sorne 1/JG¡' 
Consider any partition of N into 2 subgroups Gh G2 E ~ and any such 
functions 1/JG" i = 1,2. Consider the profile on N where aH individuals in 
the subgroup G2 are cornpletely indifferent between aH alternatives. Then 
by Individualisrn 1/JG2 is total indifference. The result foHows frorn Extended 
Pareto. 
.. 
Corollary : 
1f:3 a SWF cp that satisfies Extended Pareto, then, 
1. The functions 1/JG induced by cp satisfy Extended Pareto. 
2. cp(R"\') satisfies Extended Pareto with respect to any such 1/JG and for 
any partition of N; in particular cp satisfies Pareto. 
Proof 
1. Consider a partition of N into two subgroups: Gl and G2 • Since cp satisfies 
Extended Pareto, by Lernrna 1 one rnust have: 
1/JG¡ = cp(RG¡,ZN\G¡) 
Now consider a further partition of Gl into two subgroups Gu and Gl2 • We 
need to show that 1/JG¡ satisfies Extended pareto w.r.t these two subgroups. 
\Ve are given: for any p, q E .6.A, 
P 1/JG¡¡(RG¡¡ )q, i = 1,2 
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but we can rewrite tPGll (by Lemma 1) as: 
c.p(nGll ,IN\Gll ) 
and tPG12 as: 
Noting then that 
we can use Extended Pareto for the partition {Gn , N\Gn } to conclude 
that: 
pc.p(nGll, nG12UG2)q 
which in turn is equivalent to: 
where c.p(nG1 , I G2) is nothing but tPG1 ' One can show this for any further 
finite partitions of Gn . 
2. This follows from 1. 
.,. 
Note. Henceforth the Group Aggregation Rules referred to in the rest of 
the proof are the ones "induced" by a SWF satisfying Extended Pareto as 
shown above. 
Lemma 2: 
A SWF (respeetively Group Aggregation Rule) satisfies Extended Pareio for 
any partition of N( respeetively G): 7r iff it can be represented as: 
u = L: (JG¡,7f(Ü)UG¡ (4) 
i=1,2,3... 
respeetively 
UG = L: (JG¡,G,7f(Ü)UG¡ (5) 
i=1,2,3... 
where U represents the SWF (unique upto positive monotonic transforma-
tions), UG represents the preferences of thesubgroup G, UG¡ represents the 
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preferences of the subgroups Gi , i == 1,2,3,4.... 
f3Tr,G¡ E IR++ and Ü represents the "profile" of utility functions (which can 
be for any partitions of N). 
(To simplify notation here we drop the argument 'Ir whenever the partition 
is the trivial one. We also drop the argument G, as in equation (4) aboye, 
whenever U is a representation of a SWF. ) 
Proof 
First it is obvious that if a SWF (respectively group Aggregation Rule) can 
be represented by the aboye, then it must satisfy Extended Pareto. We now 
prove the converse. 
Observe that by part (2) of the Corol1ary to Lemma 1, Extended Pareto 
implies Pareto. We also assume that individual and social preferences (and 
hence by part (1) of the corol1ary to Lemma 1 also group preferences) satisfy 
the vN-M axioms. Hence, Proposition O ap.plies to both the SWF and to 
group preferences and both can be represented by a weighted sum of utilities 
of individuals in the society/ group. It remains to prove that social/group 
preferences can be represented as in equation 4 and 5 respectively, in the 
specific cases where subgroups are not individuals. The proof of Proposition O 
goes through just replacing individual vN-M utilities by group vN-M utilities, 
and profiles of individual preferences by profiles of group preferences.,. 
Lemma 3 now proves the result for a subgroup of three individuals and a 
profile of preferences with dimension three. 
Lemma 3: 
Let #N ;:::: 4, #A ~ 4. For al! G E ~ s.t. #G == 3 and for al! profiles on 
N such that U¡ == O( or constant), Vi f/. G; tPG satisfies Extended Pareto iJJ 
:JFn,G(un) E JR++ such that tPG can be represented by UG : A ~ IR such that: 
(1) 
UG == I: F. \ r(un - min un(a)) (6) 
nEG n,G Un (lEA 
whenever d( ü) == 3. 
(2) 
s.t. 
n E G,n E G. 
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wheT'e Un, UG E IRA, and #G = 3. 
Proof 
Since it is clear that if each UG is represented as in equation(6), it satisfies 
Extended Pareto in terms of any subgroups, we now prove the converse. 
(1) Let the 3 individuals be {í, j, k}. Let Ü represent the profile of utilities of 
the 3 individuals, and U, v, w represent utility functions for the 3 individuals 
í, j, k respectively. 9ij(U, v) denotes a function which depends on the 
individuals í, j and the utility functions U and v. Note that the order of the 
profile is maintained in the proof, although the particular notation used is 
to show clearly that the first coordinate of the function refers to the utility 
function of the individual í who'is first in the order 9ij. 
Clairn lo 
There exists a function 9ij defined for aH (u, v) E 52 which satisfy d(u, v) = 
2, and for every ordered pair {i, j} of 2 different individuals such that 
(a) 9ij(U, v) = ~;~~~, V (ü) E 53 such that Üi = Ui,Üj = Uj with 3 
individuals in G s.t. i and j belong to G and d(ü) = 3. 
(b1) 9ij(U, V).9ji(V, u) = 1, whenever d(u, v) = 2. 
(b2) 9ij(U, V)'9jk(V, W)'9ki(W, u) = 1 whenever the functions 9 are well-
defined. 
Proof: 
Since #N 2:: 3, and #A 2:: 4,:J G' e G, s.t. G' = {i, j} and a profile where 
N - 2 individuals are cornpletely indifferent and d( u, v) = 2. By Lemrna 1, 
'l/;G' satisfies Pareto, and by Lernrna 2, it is represented by : 
UG, = ¿ An,G'(Ü)un, (7) 
nEG' 
where An,G' satisfies the properties of Proposition O. Define the function 
9ij = >G'~u, v~. By the aboye, this function is well-defined whenever i #- j
J, a' v, ti 
and d(u, v) = 2. Now we can prove (a): 
By Lernrna 1 'l/JG satisfies Extended Pareto. Therefore by Lemma 2 we have, 
for GI = {í,j}, G2 = {k}, for any ordered set G = {i, j, k}, and for the 
partition 7r1 = {Gh G2 },  
UG =a:G1,G,1I"1(U, v, W)(Ai,G1(U,v)u+>'j,G1(v, u)v)+a:k,G,1I"1(W, u, v)w. 
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and for Gl = {i},G2 = {j},G3 = {k} : 
UG = ).i,G(U, v, W)U + ).j,G(V, u, W)V + ).k,G(W, v, U)W. 
where the coefficient vectors a, and ). are strictly positive. By the uniqueness 
of the coefficients in this full-dimensional case we have: 
).i,G'(U, v) _ ).i,G(U, v, w) (8)).j,G'(v, u) - ).j,G(v, u, w)' 
(note the 1r argument is dropped as by the above argument we also show the 
independence of 9ij from the partition. The argument for the subgroup G' is 
also dropped from now on since 9ij depends on this (fixed) subgroup and on 
a fixed partition.) 
(b1) i's obvious by using the definition of the function 9ij. 
(b2) If d(il) = 3 then by part(a) the result follows. 
Otherwise:3 W, U, v such that d(u, v, w) = d(v, w, u) = d(u, w, v) = 
d(u, v, w) = d(u, V, w) = d(u, v, w) = d(u, v, w) = 3 (since #A ~ 4, by 
assumption) , such that, using Claim l(a), equation (8): 
Similarly: 
And: 
9ki(W, u) = 9kj(W, V)9ji(V, u) 
Substituting for the functions 9 in equation (b2) of Lemma 3, and usmg 
successively the equivalence proved in Claim l(a) we get: 
9ij(U, V)9jk(V, W)9ki(W, u) = 9ik(U, W)9kj(W, V)9ji(V, u) 
\Vhich is equivalent by Claim l(a) to: 
And using (b1) the above expression equals 1. 
Claim 2. 
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There exists a function Gij (u, v) : 52 -+ IR+ defined for any non- constant 
u, v and any 2 individuals i, j such that 
(a) 
Gij(u, v) =9ij(U, v) (9) 
whenever d(u, v) = 2 and i =J. j 
(b) 
Gij(u, v).Gjk(v, W).Gki(W, u) = 1. (10) 
always, for any i, j, k E G. 
Proof. 
First we construct the function Gij . 
Define Gij (u, v) = 9ik(u, w )9kj(w, v). Observe that this function is well-
defined because given any pair of individuals i and j and any pair of non-
constant utility functions u, of i, and v of j we can find an individual k, and 
a utility function w for this individual such that d(u, w) = d(v, w) = 2 and 
hence the functions 9ik(U, w), and 9kj(W, v), are well-defined. It remains to 
show that the function Gij(u, v) is independent of the utility function wand 
the individual k. 
Note that #A ~ 4, and #G ~ 3 thus for any pair u, v of non-constant 
utility functions we can find w E IRA , k rt {i, j} e G such that d(u, w) = 
d(v, w) = 2. 
If i =J. j and if d(u, v) = 2 : 
then it is possible to choose w such that d(u, v, w) = 3, and therefore we 
can preve the independence using the equivalence in Claim 1(a). 
If d(u, v) =J. 2, and i =J. j: 
we only have to preve that : 
9ik(U, W).9kj(W, v) =9ik(U, W)'9kj(W, v). (11) 
whenever d(u, w) = d(w, v) = d(u, w) = d(v, w) = 2 and whenever 
k=J.i, k=J.j. 
This can be done by proving the equivalence of each side of equation (11) to 
9ik(U, W)9kj(W, v) 
It is sufficient to prove this for one side of equation (11): 
Thus choose wsuch that: 
d(u, w)=d(w, v)=2 
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This is possible given domain conditions. 
Choose Ui, Uj, Uk to satisfy: 
d(u, uj, w)=d(w, Ui, v) = d(u, Uj, W)=d(Ui, w, v)==3 
(this is possible by the domain assumption.) Thus we have: 
gik(U, W)gkj(W, v) = gij(U, Uj)gjk(Uj, W)gki(W, Ui)gij(Ui, v) 
which is equivalent by application of Claim 1 (a) and Claim 1 (b2) to: 
gik(U, Uk)gkj(Uk, v) 
Similarly for the LHS of equation (11) and choosing w= Uk, we have proved 
(11). 
If í = j and d(u, v) =1= 2: We need to prove: 
gik(U, W)gki(W, v) = gij(U, W)gji(W, v), 
whenever the functions g(.) are well defined. 
This is equivalent by Claim 1 (b1) to proving: 
gji(W, U)gik(U, w) = gji(W, V)gik(V, w) 
But this is proved already in the case í =1= j with the names of the individuals 
permuted. 
Proof of (a):  
If d(u, v) = 2, í =1= j then by definition, Gij(u, v) == gij(U, v). 
Proof of (b) 
First the equivalence is proved for í =1= j =1= k : 
By definition: 
Gij(U, v) = gik(U, W)gkj(W, v) 
Hence choosing the 3 utility functions ú, V, W such that: 
d(u, w) == d(w, v) = d(v, ú) == d(ú, w) = d(w, v) = d(v, u) = 2 
proving equation (10) is equivalent to proving: 
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By the domain assumption (#A 2:: 4)we can choose U, V, w to satisfy as 
well: 
d(u, v, w) = d(u, V, w) = d(u, V, w) = 3 
By successive applications of Claim l(a), (11) is equivalent to proving: 
\Vhich is true by Claim 1(b2). 
Ifi=j: 
Equation (12) above becomes: 
This is equivalent using Claim l(a) to: 
\iVhich is true by Claim 1(b2). 
Ifi=j=k 
Equation (12) becomes: 
g¡k(U, W)gk¡(W, v)g¡j(v, v)gj¡(v, W)g¡k(W, V)gk¡(V, u) = 1, (14) 
This is equivalent (using Claim l(a))to: 
gik(U, W)gkj(W, V)gji(V, u) = 1 
\iVhich is true by Claim 1(b1). 
Claim 3 
l'
I 
There exist functions FG(n, u), defined on N x S·, where S· is the set of 
non-constant utility functions, such that 
For al1 n E G, the function FG(n, u) is translation invariant, and positively 
homogeneous of degree 1 in u E IRA. 
Proof: 
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Observe that Clairn 2(b) yields : 
-first: Gii(U, u) = 1 (the case i = j = k and u = v =w.) 
-next Gij(u, v)Gji(v, u) = 1 (the case i = k and u =w.) 
-Finally: Vu, v E S 
(Since Gij = G1 ., using the definition of the function Gij and Clairn 1(b1).) 
JI 
Now fix sorne non-indifferent individual ka and sorne Uko E S" Then 
= FG(j, v)G ( v) (15)ij u, FG()i, u 
where we define: 
FG(n,u) = Gkon(U~, u), 
Translation invariance of FG(n, u) follows frorn the translation invariance 
of An ( Clairn 1) and frorn Clairn (2) and Proposition O; so do the hornogeneity 
properties. 
(Note In the aboye G refers to the subgroup whenever it is a subscript and 
otherwise it refers to the function Gij(u, v).) 
Clairn 4. End of the proof of Lernrna 3. 
l\ote that, by Clairn 2(a) we have 
whenever d(Ui, Uj) = 2 and i #- j. And by Clairn l(a): 
Ai(Ui, Uj, Uk))9ij(Ui,Uj = Aj(Ui, Uj, Uk) 
whenever 
d(Ui, uj, Uk) = 3. 
Thus in the full-dirnensional case we rnust have: 
-using here Proposition O and the definition~ of 9ij and Gij frorn Clairns 1 
and 2, - i. e. the product is independent of the individual and is only 
19 
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a function of the utility profile, say <I>(u¡, Uj, Uk)' We can then normalise to 
<I>(U¡,Uj,Uk) = 1 without changing social preferences(dividing the vector A-
and hence U - by <I» . Substituting for An ( (Un)nEN) in equation (5) oí" Lemma 
2, 
1 1 1 
U = U¡. F¡(u¡) +Uj. Fj(uj) +Uk· Fk(Uk)' 
Subtracting from each Un the value minaEA Un (a) leaves social preferences 
unchanged. This gives for each non-indifferent individual n E N, a uniquely 
(upto the function F) defined map u~('R.n) from his set of possible pref-
erences to utility representations of those, (subtracting from an arbitrary 
representation Un the value minaEA(un(a)), and dividing by F(n, U) -if not 
0)- such that for any {i, j, k}, á~d whenever d(ü) = 3, subgroup preferences 
are represented by 
as desired .
• 
The next part of the proof extends the result of Lemma 3 to aH sets G. 
Corol!ary 1 to Lemma 3: 
Lemma 3 holds for al! subgroups G E ~ such that #G ~ 3 and d( ü) = #G 
on al! profiles where N - G individuals are completely indifferent. 
Proof 
Since the same proof goes through for any G as long as there are at least 3 
individuals in the subgroup, it suffices to show that the function FG(n, u) is 
independent of the subgroup G. 
Thus we need to prove: 
FG(n, u) = FG,(n, u), 
whenever n E G and n E G'. By definition of the function FG(n, u) it is 
sufficient to prove that Gkon(Uko, u) is independent of any i f/. {ka, n}. 
This is equivalent to proving: 
(16) 
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whenever the functions gij (.) are we1l defined and whenever there exists an 
individuall E G such that l rt {i, j, k}. But this is equivalent to showing: 
(17) 
choosing w, wsuch that : 
d(u, w, w) = d(v, w, w) = 3 
Then each side of equation (17) equals glk(w, w), using Claim 1. 
'"Corollary 2 to Lemma 3: 
Lemma 3 holds for any subgroup G with #G = 2, d( ü) :5 2, whenever #N ~
 
4, #A ~ 4. 
Proof 
Claim 1 
Lemma 3 holds for any subgroup G with #G = 2 whenever #N ~ 4, #A ~ 
4. 
Proof: Let the subgroup G = {i, n. Since #N ~ 4 and #A ~ 4, there 
exists a profile where N - 2 individuals are totally indifferent and d( ü) = 2. 
Similarly there exists a profile where N - 3 individuals are tota1ly indifferent 
and d(ü) = 3. By Lemma 3 the case G = 3, d(ü) = 3 is already solved. Hence 
take a partition of the 3 individuals into G l and G2 such that G l = {i, n . 
By Lemma 2 we have, for s = {GI , G2 }: 
UG = OG1,S(-)UG1 + f3G2,S(-)UG2 
and by Lemma 3 we have: 
UG = L u~('Rn) 
nE G I UG2 
By the uniqueness of the coefficients for i, j we get: 
UGl = 0G1,s L u~ 
nEG1 
which can be normalised to: 
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as desired. 
Claim 2 
Lemma 3 holds for all subgroups G with #G = 2 and d(ü) ~ 1, whenever 
#N ? 4, #A? 4. 
Proof. 
Observe that, by Pareto, the statement is trivially true for any such G when-
ever d(ü) = O or the 2 individuals in G do not have opposite preferences. 
Rence it is sufficient to prove the Claim for 2 individuals with opposite pref-
erences. Let the 2 individuals be i, j. Let u be sorne fixed representation of 
R¡. Then, by Lemma 2, social preferences are given by Mu, where M E IR. 
Let w, wrepresent the utility functions of 2 individuals k, 1, k =/: 1such that 
d(w, w) = 2 and d(u, -u, w, w) = 3 (noting that this profile exists and 
two such individuals exist such that k, 1 f/. {i, j}). 
The preferences of the group G = {k, l} are given (Claim 1) by 
Now if we partition the set N into {G} and {N\Gl, we get the following: 
u - os(w'(Rk ) +w'(R¡)) + f3s(Mu) 
- or(w'(Rk ) +u'(R¡)) + f3r(w'(R¡) + (-u)'(R¡)) 
(18) 
since the case G = 2, d( ü) = 2 has been solved already. This implies by the 
condition d( u, w, w') = 3, that 
\Ve obtain then: 
f3s(Mu) = os[u'(R¡) + (-u)'R¡J = Os L u~(Rn) 
nEG 
and normalising to Os = 1 gives the same social preferences as before. 
"Lemma 4: Let the dimension 01 a profile be denoted by d, and [g, d] represent 
profiles 01 9 individuals and d dimension wh'ere d ~ g. lVhenever #N ? 4 
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and #A ~ 4 Theorem 18 holds for any [g, d], d > 2 whenever it holds for 
any profiles [g - 2, d - 1]. 
!IQQf 
For #G ~ 3, we can partition G into 2 groups: s = {m,l} e G and G' = 
{G\s} with m i= l. We have by Lernrna 2 (since the case G - 2 is ful1y solved 
by assurnption and the case G = 2 is solved by the Corol1ary to Lernrna 3: 
u = as(u~JRm) + u;(n¡)) + /3s( L: u~(nn) - u~(nm) - u;(n¡)) 
nEG 
with both as and /3s strietly positive. 
-Le. 
.! 
u = (as - /3s)(u:n(nm) + u;(n¡)) + /3s(L: u~(nn)) 
nEG 
\'h/e need to show that for sorne s, 
as - /3s = O 
Suppose V s, (as - /3s) i= OThen, we have Vm i= 1 
Adding the aboye equations for {m, l} = {i, j} and subtracting for {m, l} = 
{j, k} and for {m, l} = {i, k} we get: 
uj(n j ) = bU + p L:(u~(nn)) 
nEG 
-i.e. each u~ (nn) is a linear cornbination of::; 2 linearly independent vectors 
contradicting d( 11) > 2. 
Thus we have , choosing s such that as = /3s, 
U = /3s L: u~ (nn) 
nEG 
for sorne /3s > 0, as desired. 
8Appropriately interpreted for subgroups. 
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" Lemma 5 Let the dimension 01 a profile be represented by d. Then lor all 
profiles with #G 2:: 3, d( ü) 2:: 2, Theorem J holds lor any subgroup [g, d] il it 
holds lor the case [g + 1, d + 1]. 
Proof Let the subgroup be G and the dimension of the profile be d. By 
hypothesis the case G + 1, d(ü) = d + 1 is aIready solved. Hence add a 
non-indifferent individual i to G. Consider now the following partitions of 
the G + 1 individuals. If Gl = G and G2 = {i} denoting Gl U G2 by G12 : 
By Lemma 2 we have: 
UG12 = osUG1 + f3sUG2 
and by hypothesis (Theorem 1) we have: 
UG12 = L u~(Rn) 
nEG12 
By the uniqueness of the coefficient for the (non-indifferent) individual in G2 
we get: 
where Os > 0, as desired. 
Claim 5 proves the result for all subgroups G, whenever the conditions of the " 
theorem are satisfied. 
Lemma 6: For all profiles with #N 2:: 4 and #A 2:: 4, the theorem holds lor 
any G e N, and all profiles with d 2: 2 except the profile [N-J, 2}. 
Proof Observe that the case #G = 3, d(ü) = 3 and #G = 2 are completely 
solved and that the full-dimensional case for all G is solved by the Corollary 
1 to Lemma 3. It remains to prove therefore the cases #G 2: 3, 2 :::; d < #G, 
where d denotes the dimension of the preference profile. 
We do this using the following induction steps: 
Let the number of individuals in the subgroup be 9 and the dimension be d. 
By the Corollary to Lemma 3, the case [g, g] is solved. (The second co-
ordinate denotes the dimension). It remains to prove [g, 9 - x], where 9 - x 2: 
2. 
Observe that by Lemma 4, the cases [g, g] imply the result for all [g+2, g+l], 
with starting point of [2, 2]. Hence all cases [g, 9 - 1], will be solved by this 
for all 9 2:: 4. It also implies that all cases [g, 9 - 2] will be solved for all G 
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such that #G 2:: 6 and that all cases [9, 9 - 3] will be solved for G such that 
#G 2:: 8 and so on. 
In the next step observe that we can use Lernrna 5 to solve the case [3,2] 
(since we cannot use Lernrna 4 to solve cases of dirnension 2). Sirnilarly we 
can solve [5,3] using Lernrna 5 on [6,4] and hence [4,2]. One can then use 
Lernrna 4 again to solve all cases [G, G - 3] for all G such that #G 2:: 6. This 
irnplies by Lernrna 5 the case [5,2]. Again, use Lernma 4 to solve aH cases 
[9, 9 - 4] for all G such that #G 2:: 7 and so on. 
The idea is to use Lernrna 4 and Lernrna 5 successively, Lernrna 4 can be used 
for solving cases of dirnension greater than 2 and Lernrna 5 for the cases of 
dirnension 2. 
Now we can prove Theorern 1. 
Proof of Theorem 1 Part (A): 
Step 1 
The staternent is true for all profiles such that #N 2:: 4 and d(ü) = #N. 
Proof 
Observe that the dornain conditions of Lernrna 3 are true in this case. 
Therefore we can use the rnethod of Lernrna 3 to construct funetions F(n, u) 
for any n E N. For any n choose any set of 3 individuals containing indi-
vidual n, and any profile ü which fulfiHs the dirnension conditions. 
Clairn 1 of Lernrna 3 can now be read : 
whenever the profile ü has full dirnension (Le. d( ü) = N). (By the sarne 
proof) .
.. 
Step 2 
The staternent is true for any N 2:: 4, for all profiles such that d( ü) > 2 
Proof 
It is sufficient by Step 1 to prove the result for the less than ful1 dirnen-
sional case. For this we need Lernrna 6. 
For an arbitrary N 2:: 4, d( ü) 2:: 3, observe that the theorern holds for al1 
G, with d 2:: 2 except the case [N-l, 2] by Lernrna 6. Use therefore Lernrna' 
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4 and cases of #N - 2 individuals to solve all profiles [#N, #N - x] where 
#N -x> 2. 
Proof of Part B. Fix a SWF that satisfies Extended Pareto. Then by Part 
(A) of the proof, we know that it can be represented as: 
(19) 
for sorne functions F(n, u) (see equation (2)). 
It is sufficient to prove this for the profile where G = 3 and d( ü) is full, since 
this was the starting point of the proof of Part A (Lemma 3). 
Suppose that there exists a tPG such that there are 2 funetions F (n, u) and 
F'(n, u) such that equation (19) holds for both. Since by hypothesis the 
SWF, hence tPG, is fixed, the representation U' with the funetions F'(n, u) 
must be such that: 
Ub = {3UG +, 
with {3 > O. Since we are in the full dimensional case we have by the unique-
ness of the coefficients that: 
{3 1 
F'(n, u) 
= 1 , 
F(n, u) 
as desired.
,. 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
It is clear that whatever be the map F, the above SWF satisfies our axioms. 
l\ow we prove the converse. 
It is sufficient to prove that the functions F(n, u) of Theorem 1 are such that 
F(n, u) = F(u), the rest follows from the proof of Part 1. 
Fix a representation of individual and social preferences. Since the SWF 
satisfies Extended Pareto, by Part (1) Theorem 1, the representation of the 
SWF is as given by equation (2). Thus for any full-dimensional case we have 
that whenever the preferences (utility functions) of any 2 individuals are 
permuted then by Anonymity the social preferences (and hence the utility 
function up to a positive affine transformation) must remain the same. This 
implies by the full-dimensionality that F(n, u) = F( u). 
,. 
26 
-----------~------ ---------------------------------------
Proof of Proposition 2 is in the Appendix. 
Proof of Theorem 2: 
It is obvious that "Relative Utilitarianisrn" satisfies the axiorns above. 
Thus we now prove the converse. 
Fix an SWF satisfying Extended Pareto, Weak HA*, Anonyrnity. We need 
to show that then it can be represented by: 
where it = Un(a)-minaEA Un (a) 
p(Un) 
It is sufficient to show that if the SWF satisfies Weak HA* in addition to the 
other axiorns then F(u) = p(u), where p(u) = rnaxaEA u(a) - rninaEA u(a), 
for all subgroups of 2 individuals with full dirnension, since this irnplies the 
result for all other profiles, if we show that this irnplies that the case G = 3 
is solved9. This is easy to see using Extended Pareto, and different cornbi-
nations of the three individuals in subgroups. 
Clairn 1 Let u be a utility function on A', and P a set of lotteries on A'. Then 
uP E S is defined as follows: uP(a) = u(a) for aH a E A', and Vao E A\A', 
uP(ao) = (Pa 01 u), for sorne Pao E ~A'. Let >.(uP) = F(~P)" Then for every 
pair of lottery sets P and Q on A', and for every non-constant u, 
Er.QQf 
Observe that .N ~ 3, and #A ~ 4. Take any subgroup of 2 individuals, such 
that if u and v represent their utility functions on A', d( u, v) = 2 (this is 
possible since #A ~ 4). For any set of lotteries P on A', let uP and vP 
represent the corresponding utilities on A. Let t(P, u) = >'(uP ). By Weak 
HA"', for every 2 sets P and Q: 
3,8 > O, " 
such that: 
Va E A', 
t(P, u)u(a) + t(P,v)v(a) = ,8(t(Q,u)u(a) + t(Q,v)v(a)) +, 
9Formal1y: G =2,d(ü) =2 ==> G =3,d(ü) =3 
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By the linear independence of u and v, we get: 
t(P, u) = t(P,v), VP,Q (20)
t(Q, u) t(Q, v) 
whenever u and vare linearly independent. This is true as well whenever 
u, vare non-constant, since there exists some w E S, which is linearly 
independent of both u and v and it is easily shown that equation (20) holds 
for both u and v with w. 
Thus we can fix v non-constant, at v and we define a function H(P) = 
t(P, v), VP. Hence we have: 
t(P, u) = t(Q,u) S. d \.Ip Q A' 
H(P) H(Q) \.1 vU E an v, on (21) 
This ratio is therefore independent of P and we can define G(u) = ~Q}' for 
any fixed set Qon A'. Hence, 
'x(u P ) = G(u)H(P) V P E ~A'and V u E S· 
Next, we show that the function H(P) is constant. From the above equa-
tions we know that H(P) = H(Q) whenever the hypothesis of Weak IlA* is 
satisfied by two profiles u P and uQ • Thus, it is sufficient to show that there 
exist such profiles for any two sets P, Q. This is equivalent to requiring the 
existence of profiles of dimension at least two. This is guaranteed by our 
assumptions. 
This means that the function H(P) is constant. Thus for aH non-constant 
u, H(P) is constant and therefore ,X( uP ) is independent of P. 
Claim 2 
1
'x(u) =-p(u) 
Proof. Note that Claim 1 implies that 'x(u P ) is independent of P and hence . 
of u(ao) for aH ao that satisfy the condition that 3Pao E ~A' such that 
(u,Pao) = u(ao), i.e. that minaEA'(u) ~ u(ao) :5 maxaEA'(U). This implies 
that ,X( u) depends only on maxaEA' u(a), minaEA' u(a). Translation Invariance 
of ,X(u) then implies the resulto 
.. 
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Axiom 4: Neutrality expresses that the names of the alternatives 
do not matter. Formally, at least when A(A) consists of alllotteries 
with finite support, any permutation 7r of A induces a permutation 
of the space of preferences: 
R H R7r where pR7r q iff po 7rRq o 7r. Then 
cp[(Ry] == (cp[ (R])7r 
Neutrality is obviously satisfied by "Relative Utilitarianism." 
4.2 Necessity of the Axioms 
The Independence Axiom 
\Ve assume the vN-M axioms are satisfied for individuals but we relax the 
vN-~I axioms for society in particular the Independence axiom or the sure 
thing principIe. 
where the utilities for individuals are the usual vN-M utilities. This example 
is due to Epstein and Segal [6]. 
Continuity of preferences 
An example that violates the vN-M axioms of continuity of preferences 
is the leximin rule ( Sen [15]) that lexically chooses the (normalized) utility 
of the worst off individual for a given alternative as the social utility. 
Extended Pareto 
Since Extended Pareto implies Monotonicity (Mertens and Dhillon, [12]), 
the e.g. used here is the same as for Monotonicity, i.e. take the gradient of 
the Nash product for the non-dummy players at the maximising point (in 
the closure of C(u)), when [minaEA u(n)ln E N] is taken as the disagreement 
point. The weight of the dummy players is arbitrary. 
Anonymity. 
Otherwise use Ln ).n ~(u) - with ).n > O- as social utility. P Un 
Neutrality. Otherwise use L n q(~nn)' where J-ln == LaEA w(a)un(a), and q(un) == 
VLa w(a)[un(a) - J-lnF (if not zero) - with w(a) > O, La w(a) = 1. 
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If one chooses all w( a) equal, one obtains an example satisfying in addi-
tion neutrality, but not Weak LLA.* 
Conclusion 
This paper introduced the Extended Pareto axiom in a framework of pref-
erences over lotteries. It was shown that if the von-Neumann-Morgenstern 
axioms on preferences are satisfied by individuals and by society then this 
axiom implies that the SWF is a weighted sum of utilities where the weights 
for each' individual depend only on his utility function in the profile. The 
axiom thus implies additive separability in the SWF in this sense10 • The ax-
iom may be viewed as an analog (in the context of ordinal preferences) of the 
separability condition (Fleming [7], Arrow[2], and discussed by d'Aspremont 
[5]) which is imposed in the context of cardinal and fully comparable pref-
erences, except that in addition it embodies Pareto. With two additional 
axioms, Anonyrnity and Weak nA* a S\VF, Relative Utilitarianism, was 
characterized for all profiles of preferences where the corresponding utility 
vectors were of dimension. two at least. The Anonyrnity axiom is standard 
while Weak nA* was motivated by Arrow's nA applied to a framework of 
preferences over lotteries. 
The results used quite strongly the mathematical structure imposed by 
the vN-M axioms. In principIe, these results can be extended to the case 
where we do not directly use the vN-M axioms. Harsanyi's theorem e.g. has 
been extended in this way by Coulhon and Mongin [4], and in Mongin [13] 
using the more general notion of mixture sets. Mongin [4] has a section on 
AIgebraic Preliminaries which would be direct1y relevant if we do not restrict 
ourselves only to lotteries over a set of A, but are concerned with (more 
generally) convex subsets of vector spaces, and affine functions on these. 
APPENDIX: 
Consider Monotonicity: 
Axiom O (Axiom 5' [12]. Assume 'R.~ is total indifference, and 
'R.'k = 'R.k Vk =1= n. Then 
lONote however that it does not imply the usual form of additive separability since in 
principIe the weights for each alternative are not separable; indeed they depend on the 
utility function. 
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It is easy to see that Extended Pareto implies this form of Monotonicity. 
In the other direetion, a weak form of Extended Pareto is implied by this 
Monotonicity axiom where onl;, partitions of this type are permitted, and 
moreover where the role of the'one individual subgroup is priveleged relative 
to the other (see the latter part of the axiom). It is obvious that they are 
both.equivalent to Pareto in the case of two individuals. ,. 
Proposition Ü. The social welfare functions c.p that satisfy the Pareto axiom 
are those which can be represented by a map }¡ fmm SN to JRN such that 
b) Jf \In E N, Un is a representation of R n , then Ln}¡n (Ü). Un lS a repre-
sentation of c.p (R). 
e) • }¡n(ü) is translation invariant, i.e . 
• }¡n(ü) is positively homogeneous of degree zero in Uk \lk =1 n and, if Un 
is not constant, of degree minus one in Un, i.e. 
Proof. Let us first show the "single profile" result of Harsanyi. For ü E SN, 
U is a corrsponding social utility satisfying Pareto. 
Clearly 
e = { [((un,p) - (un,q))nEN' (U,q) - (U,p)] I p E ~(A),q E ~(A)} is sym-
metric (around zero) and convex, and e n [JR~ x 1R+J = {ü}. So F -:. 
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UA>oPC) is a vector subspace, with F n [.lR~ x .1R+] = {O}. Hence, by Fa-
rkas' lemma, there exists An > Oand J.l > Osuch that L AnXn + J.ly ~ Ofor 
(x, y) E F, and hence equality since F is a vector space, Le., 
¿An(Un,p) - ¿An(Un,q) = J.l(U,p) - J.l(U,q) 
for aH p, q E ~(A). 
Hence, dividing An by J.l, we obtain 
(U,p) = ¿An(Un,p) + (3 , Vp E ~(A) 
n 
with (3 = (U, q) - Ln An(un, q) for sorne q E ~(A).
 
Consider now, for every ('R.) E I:/v, the corresponding utility profile (Un)nEN 
where each Un is normalised such as to have maxa un(a) = 1, mina un(a) = 
Oor un(a) = O Va E A. 
Let also U be a similarly normalised representation of cp [('R.)]. 
Let A = {(An)nENIAn > O, U - Ln AnUn is constant }. 
Let M = inf{Ln AnlA E A} + 1 and AO = {A E Al Ln An ~ M}. 
Then Ao is, by the aboye, non-empty, and is convex and bounded. 
So the barycenter XR of Ao exists, and belongs to Ao. This yields a map 
from preferen~e profiles to N-tuples of positive numbers. 
Define now A( ü) for any utility profile ü from its values for the normalised 
profiles by using (c). Then clearly (a), (b) and (c) hold. 
Conversely, it is clear that any map A satisfying (a) and (c) defines 
through (b) a map from preferences to preferences that satisfies Pareto. 
,. 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
Observe that the proof of Proposition O does not use Strong Pareto; any 
form of Pareto, even Pareto Indifference is sufficient, given the vN-M axioms. 
The only difference due to using different forms of Pareto is in the signs of 
the coefficients (see e.g Mongin [13]) i.e. the vector A. Thus in particular, 
Pareto Indifference with the vN-M axioms implies that social welfare can be 
represented as an affine function on the set F. 
Second, if the sets F are equal, they will be equal even after normalising 
utilities, and the homogeneity properties of A imply that if A( ü) = A( U") 
holds for the normalised problem, it holds too for the original problem. Thus 
we can assume the utilities are normalised. 
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It suffices to prove that the set e of Proposition o is the same in both 
problems, since the vector A constructed there depends only on this set C. 
This will follow from the equality of the two sets F if we prove that U and 
U' are the same affine function on F, since by Pareto Indifference we know 
that they are affine funetions on F. Note that the hypothesis of Weak IIA*, 
implies that 
F = {([< u,p >lnENlp E .1.(A))} = {([< u,p' >lnENlp' E .1.(A'))}. 
where A' e A. That the set F contains the latter set (call it F') is obvious. 
In the other direction, for any lottery in the set F\F' by the hypothesis of 
the axiom, there exists a lottery in F' to whieh all individuals are indifferent. 
To prove Proposition 2, we distinguish two cases: (1) in whieh the extreme 
points of the convex hull of the set of alternatives in utility space (.1.A') are 
the same, and (11) in which they could be different. It is convenient and 
sufficient to prove this for the case #G = 2 and d(ü) = 2, since this implies 
the result for the case of three individuals and a full dimensional profile. 
In the first situation, we can use Weak HA* directly to conclude that (nor-
malised) social utilities must be the same on the set F' for the two profiles 
and by Pareto Indifference every lottery in F\F' is socially indifferent to 
sorne lottery in F'. This being true for both profiles, the set e is equal in the 
two cases, and hence the conclusion that A( ü) = A(üí). 
There remains to show the proof for the case 11. We can show that Weak IIA* 
and Pareto Indifference implies Neutrality in this framework, and hence one 
can permute the profile to reach the situation of (1) again in a finite number 
of steps. Thus consider two profiles of normalized utilities ü and üí, which 
satisfy the requirement that F = F'. Since the number of alternatives is more 
than 4, there is at least one alternative p that is unanimously indifferent to 
sorne lottery on the others.Thus one can move this alternative up or down 
in the individual ranking without changing the vector A as proved above. 
One can also use Pareto Indifference to derive the social preferences for an 
alternative which is unanimously indifferent to another. Consider w.l.o.g that 
we need to permute an alternative a to an alternative d. If these alternatives . 
are extreme points in the convex hull F then we can construet intermediate 
profiles where we use Weak HA* and Pareto Indifference to permute the 
t wo. In the first instance therefore move p to be unanimously indifferent to 
a without changing the vector A. We can then use Pareto Indifference to 
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derive the social preferences with respect to p and in the next step move a 
to be unanimously indifferent to d. Next move d to the position of p without 
changing the vector ,,\ and use Pareto Indifference to derive preferences for 
the permuted profile. Since there is a finite number of alternatives this can be 
done in a finite number of steps. In case either a or d or both are not extreme 
points of the convex hull, the proof proceeds in the same way, without using 
p now. 
Hence the set e is equal for any two such profiles, hence also the SWF when 
viewed as a linear functional on F. 
le 
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